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Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie & Todd K Hartman 
 
Local knowledge, local learning and predicting election outcomes: voter 
assessments of likely ƉĂƌƚǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ?
and 2017 general elections 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  
Political scientists often debate how much information people have and deploy when making 
electoral decisions. Some scholars suggest that voters are aware of which party is likely to win in their 
local constituency at British general elections; however, this might not be the case in situations when 
there is substantial and spatially varying change in the relative fortunes of two or more parties 
between elections. That argument is evaluated here using as a case study the 2015 and 2017 general 
elections in ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ PĂƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĚŽƵďůĞĚ, and it won 56 of the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ? ?ƐĞĂƚƐ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐǁŽŶũƵƐƚƐŝǆĂƚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ŝƚƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĨĞůůďǇ
about a third, and it lost 21 of those 56 seats. Analysis of British Election Survey data collected before 
and during the campaigns preceding those elections shows that most respondents were aware of the 
^EW ?ƐƐƵƌŐĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶĞǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ŵŽƐƚǀŽƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞ
ĂǁĂƌĞǁŚŝĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ^EW ?Ɛ three competitors was the biggest threat in each constituency, and that 
awareness became clearer during the campaign; yet, voters  W especially those who identified with the 
SNP and were contacted by it during the campaign  W still (incorrectly) anticipated a local SNP victory. 
 
Key words: Electoral predictions; Scottish National Party; 2015 General Election; 2017 General 
Election 
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Local knowledge, local learning and predicting election outcomes: voter 
assessments of likely ƉĂƌƚǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ?
and 2017 general elections 
 
An underlying assumption of voting behaviour studies is that the electorate is composed of rational 
individuals who make decisions on the basis of substantial volumes of information gleaned during 
the campaign (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Merrill and Grofman 1999; Himmelweit et 
al., 1981; Rose and McAllister, 1990). Voters process the information in terms of costs and benefits 
and then make informed choices  W whether to vote at a general election, for example, and, if so, for 
which party and/or candidate. Yet, some scholars argue that voters have neither the time nor the 
inclination to assemble and then evaluate large bodies of information; instead, they use heuristics  W 
such as their opinions of party leaders  W as short-cuts to decision-making (Fiorina, 1981; Sniderman 
et al., 1991; Clarke et al., 2009; Green and Jennings, 2017). Even so, voters need some information 
on which to operate. This model of decision-making has been strongly criticised by Achen and 
Bartels (2016:  ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽƐƚƌĞƐƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐŚĞĞƌŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞŽĨŵŽƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? So 
how much do people really know about their local electoral situation, and what do they learn during 
the campaign? 
 
In electoral systems such as that used for general elections in the United Kingdom two 
considerations are relevant to most voters. The first concerns the political parties, which seek to get 
as many MPs as possible elected so that they can influence government formation and subsequent 
policy development  W as a majority government, as members of a coalition or other inter-party 
agreement, or as an opposition holding a government to account. In this context, potential voters 
evaluate the parties and their policy proposals  W many using heuristics such as their opinions of the 
party leaders  W on which the national campaigns increasingly focus. At the 2017 UK General Election, 
for example, many electors are reported to have told canvassers that they approved of the Labour 
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐďƵƚĐŽƵůĚ not vote for it because they believed its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, was not a 
credible Prime Minister (Ross and McTague, 2017; Shipman, 2017). 
 
The second consideration concerns the context in their local constituency. At most UK 
general elections the outcome in many constituencies is almost certain long before the votes are 
canvassed, let alone cast and counted. These safe seats occur where one of the parties had such a 
substantial majority over the others at the previous contest that a change in incumbency is 
extremely doubtful save a major shift in public opinion. In such constituencies, some voters  W 
especially those with little interest in the election outcome and for whom voting does not evoke a 
strong sense of civic duty  W may decide not to bother to vote. In safe seats, even the parties are 
unlikely to expend valuable resources to canvass their support (Denver and Hands, 1997). If electors 
believe that the seat where they live is marginal, on the other hand, and think that their vote could 
make a difference to the outcome, they are more likely not only to vote but also to consider the 
option carefully and come to a reasoned decision regarding which party/candidate to support 
(Denver and Hands, 1985; Downs 1957, Pattie and Johnston, 1998). In such situations, too, the 
parties with a chance of winning the seat are likely to canvass support there, providing information 
regarding the nature of the local contest, on which voters may base their decisions. 
 
ƵƚŚŽǁĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŝƐǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ůŽĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇ ?
Do they believe that the seat is safe for one of the parties, or do they think that two (or more) 
parties have a chance of victory? And do those beliefs become more accurate as voters are provided 
with information during the campaign? 
 
There is a growing literature, originating in the United States (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Skalahan, 
1989), exploring ǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĂƚƵƐĞƐƐƵƌǀĞǇŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ
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inquiring which party/candidate respondents believe will win in their home district/constituency. 
Graefe (2014) has shown that citizens provide some of the most accurate estimates in forecasting 
American presidential election results, and more recent analyses indicate that the larger the group 
surveyed (e.g. aggregated by a US state) or ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝƚƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?e.g. measured by the 
higher their educational qualifications), the better the forecasts (Murr, 2015). Comparable work in 
Germany has shown that better forecasts are provided by individuals in large social networks 
containing considerable political expertise and which involve substantial political discussion (Leiter 
et al., 2018)  W although Belgian data suggest that individuals with partisan attachments are more 
likely to over-ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?^ƚŝĞƌƐĂŶĚĂƐƐŽŶŶĞǀŝůůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Work on citizen forecasting has also been extended to Great Britain. The British Election 
^ƚƵĚǇ ?^ ?ƐƵƌǀĞǇƐŚĂǀĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇĂƐŬĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
chances of success in their local constituency. In most cases this was a binary question  W for 
example,  ‘ǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌƚǇŚĂƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? ?DƵƌƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?has analysed the 
responses, concluding that most electors were accurate in their expectations, and he has used these 
expectations to forecast the outcome in each seat (see also Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2011). In 
some ways this accuracy is unsurprising, given  W as noted above  W that most seats at most elections 
are considered safe for one of the parties (see Curtice, 2018, on the declining number of marginal 
seats over the last half-century). Of more interest is how accurate their perceptions are in the 
marginal constituencies, especially when there is considerable change in the relative popularity of 
each party between elections, and also whether those perceptions change during the campaign.  
 
hƐŝŶŐƐƵƌǀĞǇĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ ?ǁĞĂŶĂůǇƐĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ
ĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?h<ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐƚŽ: (1) identify whether 
ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞŝr home constituency reflected either (or 
both) of its positions at the preceding election and the outcome of the next; and (2) determine 
whether those assessments changed during the election campaign, and whether any such changes 
were linked to the parties canvassing of their support. The results allow an overall evaluation of the 
extent of voter knowledge of two, substantially changing, electoral situations  W could they accurately 
predict which party would win in their home constituency? For the 2015 election, the analyses focus 
ŽŶƚŚĞƐƵƌŐĞŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ^EW ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶ
support but also the relative advance of each of the other three parties. These data show that local 
voters were generally well aware of the ^EW ?Ɛ prospects in their home constituencies, especially 
among those who were more interested in politics, those who identified with the party, and those 
canvassed for support during the last weeks of the campaign. 
 
Scotland as a case study 
 
Scotland provides an excellent case study to investigate the accuracy of voter expectations. At 
previous elections very few of its constituencies were marginal, but between 2010 and 2015 there 
was a substantial surge in support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), followed by a significant 
decline at the next election only two years later. In 2010, the SNP won 20 per cent of the votes cast 
ŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĂŶĚũƵƐƚƐŝǆŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?ƐĞĂƚƐ ?ĂƚƚŚĞŶĞǆƚĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŽ
50 per cent, and it won all but three of the seats  W even over-turning majorities against it of 40 
percentage points or more in 10 constituencies (all of them won by Labour in 2010)  W and by 
between 30-40 points in a further 15 constituencies. At the 2017 election the ^EW ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĨĞůůƚŽ
36.9 per cent, and it lost 21 of the seats won just two years previously: its share of the votes cast fell 
by more than 15 percentage points in 26 of the seats. Alongside these substantial, and spatially 
varying, changes in SNP support between 2015 and 2017 were major shifts in support for the other 
three parties that contested all 59 seats at each of the elections. The Conservative share fell (very 
slightly) in just one constituency, for example, and increased by 12 points or more (to a maximum of 
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 ? ? ?ŝŶŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƐ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶŵĞĂŶǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ ? ?ƐĞĂƚƐǁĂƐ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞ
points between 2010 and 2015 (when it was defeated in 40 of the 41 seats won in 2010): between 
2015 and 2017 its vote share declined again in 13 but increased by over 5 points (to a maximum of 
12) in a further 22 constituencies. The Liberal Democrats also lost support (by as much as 21 points) 
in 11 seats between 2015 and 2017. In short, almost every Scottish constituency experienced 
substantial changes in support for at least two of the four political parties at both of those elections. 
 
Building on its seven years as the leading party in the Scottish Parliament (Mitchell et al., 
2011) and mobilisation of a very substantial minority of the electorate during its campaign for a  ‘yes ? 
vote in the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence (McCrone, 2017), a surge in support for the 
SNP was widely anticipated and much discussed in the media well before the 2015 election 
(Henderson and Mitchell, 2018). An opinion poll conducted in late April 2015 by Ipsos/MORI for the 
STV television channel suggested that the SNP would win 54 per cent of the votes if an election were 
held then, for example, while on the basis of that and other polls one month before the election it 
was estimated that the party would return between 38 and 54 of Scotland ?Ɛ ? ?DWƐ. On election day 
(7 May) that estimate was refined to 52: the SNP won 56.1 
 
In April 2017 the Prime Minister called a snap general election, seeking to enhance the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐƚŽďŽůƐƚĞƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŚĞƌŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌ
ƚŚĞh< ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĨŽƌŵĂůůǇannounced a few weeks 
earlier. In Scotland much political debate followed that decision to withdraw, which had been 
opposed by a majority of voters there. It ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ?ŐŝǀĞŶ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶ
EU membership, another independence referendum should be held; the Scottish Parliament voted 
in favour of this SNP proposal in March 2017.2 This was strongly opposed by the Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties and by a considerable proportion of the Scottish electorate. As 
a conseƋƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇĨĞůů; an initial interpretation was that the other three parties 
would split the anti-SNP vote in 2017, allowing it to retain most of its 2015 gains. But as the 
campaign proceeded a strong performance by the Conservatives and their leader, Ruth Davidson, 
suggested that they would benefit most from the shift as the party most likely to hold the line 
against another independence referendum (Henderson and Mitchell, 2018). 
 
Further, as this Conservative revival became more apparent some potential Labour or Liberal 
Democrat supporters may have voted tactically to defeat the SNP (as voters might also in seats 
where the other two parties were seen as the major contender). A March 2017 opinion poll, 
conducted before the unexpected general election was called, indicated that 47 per cent of 
respondents would vote for the SNP if there were a general election then, whereas just before 
polling day on 7 June another found that support had fallen to 40 per cent. Estimates of ƚŚĞ^EW ?Ɛ 
likely tally of seats did not suggest a major shift, however: three weeks before polling day it was put 
at 45-54, and on polling day itself 43-54;3 both vote and seat shares were over-estimated. The 
decline in SNP support was spatially variable and benefited different parties across the 59 
constituencies ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶĐĞǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĂƚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ P>ĂďŽƵƌǁŽŶ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ
of the votes and 41 seats in 2010 but 24.3 per cent and just one seat in 2015, making only a small 
recovery in vote share (to 27.1 per cent) in 2017 but gaining six seats. The main advance in 2017 was 
by the Conservatives, whose vote share in 2010 and 2015 was 16.7 and 14.9 per cent respectively, 
                                                          
1 The opinion poll data and seat estimates were produced by http://www.electoralcalculus.co.uk/ 
polls17.html. 
2 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scottish-independence-referendum-indyref-
2-nicola-sturgeon-vote-date-latest-a7654591.html. 
3 The opinion poll data were obtained from the same source as those for 2015; the estimated seat 
tallies came from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_general_election,_2017.  
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on each occasion delivering just one Conservative MP; in 2017 their vote share almost doubled to 
 ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ? ?DWƐ ?dŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ
elections  W from 18.8 through 7.5 to 6.8 per cent; they won eleven seats in 2010, one in 2015, and 
four in 2017. 
 
This volume of change in Scotland provides a valuable case study of the extent to which 
voters were aware of the ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĨŽƌƚƵŶĞƐ ?ŝĚƚŚĞǇƐĞĞƚŚĞ^EWůĂŶĚƐůŝĚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶtheir 
home constituencies in  ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚǁŽǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌǁĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĂǁĂƌĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞ
but also which seats it was most likely to lose? Further, did that awareness change during the 
campaign? 
 
Measuring local expectations of victory 
 
A new British Election Study (BES) Panel Survey of the British electorate was established in 2014, and 
to date 14 waves of data have since been collected. Respondents to Wave 4 were contacted in 
March 2015, just before the general election campaign began, and those who responded to Wave 5 
were contacted (as sub-samples) at some time in March-May 2015, during the campaign. Wave 11 
contacted respondents in April-May 2017, before the campaign for the 2017 general election, and 
sub-samples were then contacted for Wave 12 during the campaign in May-June. In all of these 
ǁĂǀĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĂƐŬĞĚ ‘,ŽǁůŝŬĞůǇĚŽǇŽƵƚŚink  ? ?ƉĂƌƚǇǆ ? ?. ?ǁŝůůǁŝŶŝŶǇŽƵƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇ ?
ŽŶĂƐĐĂůĞƌĂŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ ? ‘vĞƌǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽǁŝŶ ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ‘vĞƌǇůŝŬĞůǇƚŽǁŝŶ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐĐĂŶďĞ
interpreted as percentage odds, with a response of 50 suggesting an equal chance of winning or 
losing (though, of course, we cannot know whether the respondents interpreted them in this way). 
 
Histograms of the distribution of the evaluations at the 2015 pre-campaign survey (i.e. Wave 
4) suggest that in the aggregate respondents were generally aware of the fŽƵƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ
winning across the 59 constituencies (Figure 1). The first two  W the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats  W have very clear modal values of 0; a substantial number of respondents thought neither 
party had much chance of success locally. For the Conservatives, this reflected their weak 
performance in 2010  W when they won only one seat  W and the lack of any subsequent improvement. 
The Liberal Democrats won eleven Scottish seats in 2010 but within months of their entering a 
coalition with the Conservatives after that election polls showed that their support had declined by 
about two-thirds, which suggested that most of the seats would be unwinnable in 2015  W and the 
histogram indicates that this was the local ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĐůĞĂƌŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇǀiew. For Labour (note that 
the vertical scale on the last two histograms differs from that for the first two), which won 41 seats 
in 2010, the tri-modal distribution suggests a repeat; ĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? expectations were 
greater than 50, but the absence of a large number recording expectations of 75 of more suggests 
worries that seats might be lost. The final histogram shows considerable expectations of SNP success 
across much of the country  W reflecting what the media were reporting from the opinion polls. 
 
 
<< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
 dŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĚĚƐƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƐĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĞƋƵĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ W 
ŝ ?Ğ ?ĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŵĂƌŐŝŶŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĚĞĨĞĂƚĂƐĂƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐĐĂƐƚ W but a general 
relationship can be anticipated. Its nature is assessed here according to two separate sets of 
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ĨǀŽƚĞƌƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶĂĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŝƚƐ
performance there at the previous contest, then there should be a close relationship between the 
outcome of that previous election and the odds percentages of victory at the next. If, on the other 
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hand, voters are aware of changes in the likelihood of a local victory since the last election, there 
should be a closer relationship with the outcome at the forthcoming contest. 
 
Expectations of an SNP victory in 2015 
 
Table 1 addresses those two arguments for the 2015 election. The ^ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?expectations of 
an SNP victory locally have been amalgamated into six groups ranging from those where victory is 
unexpected (0-24), through those where the odds are close to even (40-49 and 50-59) to those 
where victory is considered very likely (75-100); these form the columns in the two blocks of data. In 
the first of those blocks the rows refer to the local outcome in 2010; in the second they refer to the 
actual outcome in 2015. In each case, the margins of victory-or-loss are also placed in six groups, 
with their borders reflecting the different outcomes (the SNP won 6 seats in 2010 and 56 in 2015).4 
Thus in the first block of data, the first row refers to the constituencies where the SNP lost by 30 
points or more in 2010: 12.1 per cent of respondents there assessed its chances of a local victory as 
between 0-24, whereas 40.2 assessed them as 75 or greater. 
 
<< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
Each row in the table shows the percentage of respondents in that group of constituencies 
giving the expectation of an SNP victory shown in the column headings (with the total number of 
respondents shown in the final column). If a likelihood of 50 or greater is taken as an indicator that a 
party is considered more likely than not to win in a constituency, then a majority of respondents 
across all seats (75.7 per cent), as well as in each group according to the 2010 result (i.e. the various 
rows), expected an SNP victory in their home constituency. In general, the percentage of 
respondents clearly anticipating an SNP victory (i.e. a value of 75-100) should increase down the six 
rows for the column headed 75-100, and this was indeed the case. (There were no constituencies 
where the SNP lost by less than 10 percentage points in 2010.) Although the general pattern is as 
expected  W the better the pĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ performance there in 2010 the greater the odds percentage that it 
would win locally in 2015  W nevertheless substantial proportions of the respondents still provided 
values that were out-of-kilter with the outcome in 2010, let alone what the polls had been telling 
them about the increases in support for the SNP in the months before the general election was 
called. Of those living in the seats which the SNP won by a comfortable majority of 10 percentage 
points or more in 2010, for example, 15.2 per cent gave an odds percentage less than 50, implying 
that they thought the SNP was more likely to lose than win there. Such low expectations are oddly 
placed when compared with those of the majority of respondents living in the constituencies where 
the SNP performed very badly in 2010 (i.e. lost by more than 30 percentage points to the winning 
party): 40.2 per cent of them gave the SNP an odds percentage greater than 75 and a further 20.8 
per cent an odds of 60-75. High expectations also characterised respondents in the marginal seats 
that the SNP won by less than 10 points in 2010: 72.5 per cent thought victory there very likely in 
2015.  
 
Relatively high expectations in the seats lost by the SNP in 2010 could reflect respondents 
factoring in the known surge in SNP support that the polls and the media were reporting (and the 
SNP itself was promoting: Curtice et al., 2015; Mitchell, 2015; Diffley, 2017). This is evaluated in the 
second block of data in Table 1 where expectations are correlated with the actual outcome in each 
constituency. As in the previous analysis, the general pattern is as expectĞĚ ?ƚŚĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĞ^EW ?Ɛ
performance in 2015 the greater the likelihood that respondents expected a victory there. Thus, for 
example, 39.3 per cent of respondents in the three constituencies where the SNP lost in 2015 gave 
                                                          
4 Given the non-normal distributions shown in Figure 1, summary statistics were not viable as indicators of 
variations. 
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an odds percentage of victory there of less than 50, whereas in those that it won by 20 points or 
more 77.8 per cent gave an odds percentage greater than 50  W and just under half gave an odds 
greater than 74. But again, there were anomalies; in those seats that were won by a wide margin of 
20 points or more, for example, 22.0 per cent of respondents still said a defeat was more likely than 
a victory (i.e. an odds percentage less than 50). 
 
Expectations of an SNP victory in 2017 
 
The next general election was held only a little more than two years later in the same constituencies, 
so ǀŽƚĞƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶǁĞůůĂǁĂƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐůŽĐĂůƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞǇ
factored in the polling predictions of a substantial decline ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
electorate.5 Data from the BES Wave 11 (i.e. conducted just after the election was called in 2017 and 
before intensive campaigning began  W the election was unexpected by all parties) are analysed in 
Table 2 and are generally consistent with the expected pattern.6 A majority of all respondents (56 
per cent) said that an SNP victory in their constituency was very likely  W odds of 75 or more  W and 
there was a plurality with that view in every group of constituencies according to the 2017 outcome, 
although, as before, the better the outcome for the SNP the larger the percentage of local 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐǁŚŽĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇƚŚĞƌĞ. (Only 30.7 per cent returned odds of 75 or 
more in the seats where the SNP lost by over 20 points in 2017, for example, as against 63.6 per cent 
in those where the SNP candidate won by 10 or more percentage points.) 
 
<< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
Figure 2 reflects those continued high expectations ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐĨŽƌƚƵŶĞƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƵƉ
to the 2017 contest and the relatively bleak expectations of local success for the other three parties, 
for each of which the clear modal odds percentage was zero and very few returned a likelihood of 75 
or greater. To the extent that one or more of them was expected to experience a resurgence of 
support, the distributions suggest that Labour was believed more likely to than the Conservatives 
(on the campaigns in Scotland see Shipman, 2017, Chapter 23). As ĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?Ɛ
hegemony was considered likely to continue, with a modal odds percentage in the 70s and relatively 
few respondents giving an expectation for a local victory of less than 50. 
 
<< FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
The first block in Table 2 cross-tabulates those pre-campaign (Wave 11) expectations of a 
ůŽĐĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŽƐĞůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƐƚŚĞ
SNP won then by a margin of 20 points or more were most likely to express high expectations about 
another victory there, although only 60.6 per cent reported odds of over 74 and 18.0 per cent 
thought defeat more likely than victory (i.e. odds of less than 50). By contrast, in the three seats the 
SNP failed to win in 2015 nearly half of the 123 respondents thought defeat again more likely than 
victory  W although over one-fifth (21.1 per cent) thought a victory highly likely. Was the general 
pattern a reflection of what happened? The final block in Table 2 cross-tabulates the Wave 11 
expectations against the 2017 election outcome and shows even more anomalous results than at the 
                                                          
5 Several forecasters published estimates of the outcome in every constituency on the web, but the number of 
voters who either accessed these data or had their attention drawn to them by either the media or the 
political parties is unknown. In any case, as with the polls discussed above, all three over-estimated the 
number of seats the SNP would win  W 47, 51 and 51 respectively (Johnston et al, 2018). 
6 The different Ns in the two parts of this table reflect differences in the number of missing observations for 
the relevant variables. 
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previous contest. In the seats where the SNP lost by more than 20 points, a majority of the 101 
respondents (67.3 per cent) thought a victory more likely than a defeat and only 9.9 per cent 
thought defeat very likely. Indeed, whatever the outcome  W the SNP won in 35 seats and lost in 24  W 
a majority of respondents thought that a victory was much more likely than defeat (i.e. an 
expectation of victory less than 50). 
 
These first descriptive analyses have indicated that although in general respondents were 
reasonably aware of the likely outcome for the SNP in their local constituency before the campaign 
started for each of the two elections, nevertheless there were many whose expectations were 
considerably out of line with both that general pattern and the actual outcome. (It was the same 
with voters who supported the other three parties, but those data have not been presented here.) 
Did the campaigns change that? Were some groups of voters (those most interested in elections, for 
example) more accurate in their expectations than others? And were certain types of voter  W e.g. 
those who identify with a party  W more likely to assess its likely performance accurately than others? 
(Taber and Lodge  W 2006: 767  W ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĞƐĐĂƉĞƚŚĞ
pull of their prior attitudes and beliefs, which guide the processing of new information in predictable  
 ?ǁĂǇƐ ? ? ?
 
Campaign Impacts? 
 
To answer those questions we suggest that: (1) those interested in the election would be more 
accurate in their estimates than those who were not; (2) those who identified with the party would 
have higher expectations in their estimates than those who did not; and (3) those who had been 
contacted by the party in the preceding four weeks (this is the question asked in the BES surveys) 
would have higher expectations than those who were not  W on the argument that if a party contacts 
you that probably means it thinks it has a chance of victory there.  
 
Foreseeing the 2015 surge? 
 
In this first evaluation we selected respondents living in the six constituencies that the SNP won in 
2010 (i.e. the lowest row in the first block of Table 1) and contrasted those who evaluated the 
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŐĂǀĞĂŶŽĚĚƐƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨ75 or 
more. On all three comparisons, the expected differences emerged. Only 29.8 per cent of 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐǁŚŽŐĂǀĞƚŚĞŽĚĚƐŽĨĂŶ^EWǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĂƐ ? ?ŽƌůĞƐƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ ‘ǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ?
in the election, for example, compared to 60.8 per cent who gave odds of 75 or greater; the 
interested were better informed. Of those who gave odds of 50 or less, only 9.7 per cent identified 
with the SNP, compared with 39.9 per cent of those who expected another SNP victory there (odds 
of 75 or more); and only 9.7 per cent of those who gave odds of 50 or less had been contacted by 
the SNP in the weeks leading up to the survey, compared to 25.7 per cent of those who gave odds of 
75 or more. Just before the 2015 campaign began, therefore, among respondents living in an SNP-
held constituency those interested in the election, those who identified with the party and those 
who had been contacted by it were more certain about its chances of winning again in 2015 whereas 
ƚŚĞĚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ?ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^EW ?ĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂĚŶ ?ƚďĞĞŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĞĚ
were either less so  W or wrong! 
 
Did things change during the 2015 campaign? Among those who gave odds of 75 or more of 
an SNP victory in 2015 in the seats it won in 2010, unsurprisingly very few changed their position 
markedly. Just under half gave a higher score in the campaign (Wave 5) than in the pre-campaign 
(Wave 4) survey; ŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐŽĚĚƐŽĨĂƐĞĐŽŶĚǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ, few changed their 
estimate by more than 10 points. For them, nothing substantial changed during the campaign. 
Change was much more substantial among those living in SNP-held seats who before the campaign 
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started gave the party a less than evens chance of victory again  W with one respondent changing the 
odds from 0 to 100. Respondents were questioned again immediately after the election (i.e. in Wave 
6) and asked if they had been contacted by the parties during the campaign ?ƐůĂƐƚĨŽƵƌǁĞĞŬƐ. 
Almost all of those who reported contact with the SNP increased theiƌĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^EW ?Ɛ
chances between Waves 4 and 5, in most cases increasing the odds from less than to more than 50; 
canvassing their support led to people increasing their expectations of the party winning. 
 
These data suggest that those who are disinterested in an election, do not identify with a 
specified party, and are not contacted by it are least likely to be relatively accurate in their estimates 
ŽĨŝƚƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨůŽĐĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶƐĞĂƚƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚǁĞůů ?But 
what of seats where success should have been unexpected  W those that the SNP lost by more than 
30 percentage points in 2010 (the top row in the first block of data in Table 1)? These are the 26 
seats that the SNP was least likely to win but, given the surge in its support, it achieved victory in all 
but one. As the first block of data in Table 1 shows, 71.4 per cent of respondents there gave it a 
more than evens chance of victory before the campaign began and we expected that these would be 
the people more interested in the election, those who identified with the SNP, and those contacted 
by it. All three expectations were confirmed: of those who gave the SNP a victory expectation of 75 
points or more, 72.9 were very interested in the election, compared with 56.5 per cent of those who 
gave odds of 50 or less; similarly, of those in the first category, 38.2 per cent identified with the SNP 
compared to 17.3 per cent of those in the second category; and 33.0 per cent of those who gave the 
SNP a less than evens chance of a local victory had been contacted by the party in the previous four 
weeks compared to 61.4 per cent of those who gave the SNP an odds-on chance of winning. Of 
those who gave the SNP odds of a local victory of less than 50 before the campaign, four-fifths 
increased those odds by the time they were questioned during the campaign. Among those 
reporting that they were contacted during the campaign (i.e. during Wave 5) their odds of an SNP 
victory locally increased by an average of 32.8 points, compared to 14.8 for those who were not. 
Again, it appears that the information provided to people when they were canvassed by the party 
led to them increasing their expectations that it would win locally. 
 
Anticipating the 2017 SNP decline? 
 
The SNW ?ƐƐƵƌŐĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇĂsubstantial fall in support two years later. At most UK 
elections, a party which won a constituency by between 10 and 20 percentage points at one contest 
could expect to hold it again at the next. The SNP won 22 seats by such a margin in 2015, but lost in 
10 of them two years later; what were the expectations there? The final row in the first block in 
Table 2 shows that the great majority of respondents expected an SNP victory again; over half gave 
an odds of 75 or more. Among them, over 64.6 per cent said they were very interested in the 
election as against 51.1 per cent of those who gave the odds of a further SNP victory in their 
constituency as less than 50; and 35.9 per cent of the group who thought another SNP victory very 
likely identified with the SNP, more than twice the 16.5 per cent of those who gave odds of less than 
50  W further suggesting that at least some of those with high expectations of a further SNP victory 
locally were motivated by their strong partisanship for the party. Regarding contact, at the start of 
the campaign of those who had been contacted by any of the parties among those giving odds of 75 
or more 38.3 per cent had been contacted by the SNP in the previous four weeks, whereas 27.4 per 
cent had been contacted by the Conservatives, 22.7 per cent by Labour and 14.4 by the Liberal 
Democrats; among those who gave odds of 50 or less the respective percentages were 26.1, 22,7, 
21.0 and 11.4. Those who saw defeat as likely had more contact from the other parties relative to 
the SNP. Similar differences were reported after the election, when again respondents were asked 
about contact in the preceding four weeks. Among those expecting another SNP win in their 
constituency, 60.6 per cent had been contacted by the SNP, 42.4 per cent by the Conservatives, 38.8 
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per cent by Labour and 28.5 per cent by the Liberal Democrats. The corresponding percentages 
among those with low expectations of an SNP victory were 36.9, 34.7, 31.3 and 21.6. 
 
dŚĞƐĞĚĂƚĂƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐůŽĐĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞƐŝŶďŽƚŚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?,
ůŽĐĂůǀŽƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁĞůůĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?tŚĞƌĞ
the party had performed well at the previous election, they were more likely to rate its chances of 
victory higher than were those living in constituencies where it performed less well. Further, 
changes in SNP support between the contests also influenced the evaluations; some voters, at least, 
were tracking the ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĂŶĚĂĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?Ƶƚ
there were considerable variations in those assessments. Those who were more interested in politics 
ǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞ ‘ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇůŽĐĂů outcome than those who 
were less interested  W as were those who identified with the party compared with those who did 
ŶŽƚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐĐĂŶǀĂƐƐŝŶŐĨŽƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƐƚǁĞĞŬƐŽĨƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ
ŚŽǁǀŽƚĞƌƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛůocal prospects; those contacted appeared to assume that the 
SNP had a good chance of winning locally and adjusted their estimates of that occurring accordingly. 
 
Inter-party competition 
 
In making their estimates ŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ home constituency, respondents 
were not necessarily playing a zero-ƐƵŵŐĂŵĞƐŽƚŚĂƚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ^EW ?Ɛ
chances there as 70, then the sum of their estimates for the other three parties could not exceed 30. 
They might express their uncertainty by giving more than one party a chance of victory exceeding 
50. Two examples illustrate this. In the first (Figure 3[a]) the mean expectation of an SNP victory for 
each of the 59 constituencies in the 2015 pre-campaign survey is graphed against the comparable 
mean for a Labour victory. Labour won 41 seats at the previous contest in 2010, and in all of those 
constituencies respondents gave them a more than evens chance of victory again, compared to 
much lower odds in the 18 where they lost in 2010. Expectations were higher where the party 
traditionally performed well. But in all of the Labour-held seats respondents also gave the SNP a 
more-than-evens chance of victory  W in most of them averaging around 65. Expectations of an SNP 
victory were generally greatest where Labour lost in 2010; elsewhere, voters were, in effect, 
undecided whether either Labour would win again or the seat would be lost in the SNP surge. Very 
little changed during the campaign: Figure 3[b] shows, using the Wave 5 campaign data, that, in 
general, in the seats Labour won in 2010 mean expectations for both a Labour and an SNP victory in 
2015 increased slightly. 
 
<< FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
 
The second example is for the contest between the SNP and the Conservatives in 2017. 
Before the campaign began the mean expectation was of an SNP victory (i.e. odds of 50 or greater) 
in all but two of the constituencies  W those won by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats 
respectively in 2015 (Figure 4[a]). There were four where the odds of a Conservative victory were 
placed above 50 on average, alongside an average of 60 or more for an SNP victory there; all those 
seats were won by the Conservatives in 2017, as were three others where the odds were assessed as 
just below 50. In general, voters were aware of where the Conservatives were most likely to displace 
the SNP. This became even clearer during the campaign (Figure 4[b]) when odds greater than 50 
were assessed for all but one of the seats that the Conservatives eventually won  W and there were 
only two constituencies where the SNP won despite odds of a Conservative win exceeding 50. (There 
were also approximately even chances of a Conservative victory in seats won by the Liberal 
Democrats.) 
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<< FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
In both examples, therefore, although before the campaign began respondents gave 
relatively high assessments of the chances of the previous victor winning again (Labour in 2015 and 
SNP in 2017) they also were able to identify the likely alternative winner. Further, in both cases the 
likely outcome was clarified during the campaign. Similar situations occurred with regard to the 
ƐĞĂƚƐǁŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^EWďǇ>ĂďŽƵƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
victories then were more unexpected. 
 
Predicting campaign effects 
 
According to these arguments, survey respondents might re-assess the odds of a party winning in 
their constituency during an election campaign as a consequence of the general campaign mood, as 
expressed through the media (drawing considerably on opinion polls), and the intensity of local 
canvassing. Much research has shown that voters contacted by a party during British general 
election campaigns are more likely to turn out and vote for it (although there is an endogeneity 
effect  W ƚŚŽƐĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĞĚĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ PJohnston et al., 2012; Pattie et al., 
2015). Here we argue that those contacted by a party are more likely to consider it likely to win in 
their constituency than those not contacted  W contact indicating that a party has reasonable 
expectations of a local victory (parties rarely expend much time, money and other resources 
canvassing support in seats they know they are going to lose: Johnston and Pattie, 2014). 
 
To test this argument, we conducted separate ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?
expectations of each party winning in their local constituency in 2017  W when the outcome across 
the constituencies was more variable than in 2015  W in both the pre-campaign and campaign 
surveys. Those expectations are the dependent variables; the key independents are whether they 
were contacted during the previous four weeks by each of the four parties and which party was the 
eventual local winner. Two other variables are included as controls. The first is ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŵĂƌŐŝŶŽĨ
victory/defeat at the 2015 election, calculated as the difference in percentage share of the votes 
cast between it and the second-placed party if it won there in 2015 and between it and the winning 
party if it lost (i.e. a negative value if the party lost there in 2015 and a positive value if it won). The 
second is whether the respondent identified with the party. (We also explored whether interest in 
the election was linked to the evaluations, but the lack of any significant relationships in an initial 
exploration suggested this was not the case so that variable was excluded.) Contact was determined 
by answers to questions regarding whether respondents had been contacted during the previous 
four weeks by any of the parties, and if so which. Finally, we included a variable indicating whether 
the party won in the constituency in 2017, exploring whether respondents were on average 
sufficiently aware of the likely victor in their home constituency to give it greater odds of success 
there. 
 
The regression results are all in line with expectations (Table 3), although the low R2 values 
(not unusual for analyses of such survey data) suggest considerable random variation  W again not 
surprising given the use of a 0-100 scale for the dependent variable, which calls for a degree of 
precision that few respondents were able to deploy.7 
 
<< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
                                                          
7 In general, the higher the degree of measurement error in a variable the larger the standard errors of 
estimates and hence the smaller the likelihood of finding a significant relationship (see Blackwell et al., 2017). 
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The first block of regressions in Table 3 relates to the 2017 pre-campaign (Wave 11) survey. 
All four ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŵĂƌŐŝŶŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƌĞďŽƚŚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ
and statistically significant: as expected, the better ĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?s performance in 2015 the greater the 
average expectation of its victory in 2017. The coefficients for whether the respondent identified 
with the relevant party are also all statistically significant and relatively large, averaging some 12.5 
points on the 0-100 scale, indicating that voters who identify with a party are on average more 
optimistic about its prospects than those who do not. (There is potential endogeneity here; people 
may be more likely to identify with a party in places where it is more likely to win. Or it might  W as in 
the Belgian study (Stiers and Dassonneville, 2018)  W ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ‘ǁŝƐŚĨƵůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ďǇĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ
supporters.) 
 
Turning to the contact variables, a respondent who had been contacted by any of the parties 
during the previous four weeks was more likely to assess ƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ chances of a local victory by as 
many as several points higher than those not contacted. Each of the three parties contesting seats 
currently held by the SNP had its chances of a local victory rated higher if respondents there had 
been contacted by the relevant party than if they had not; in addition, those contacted by the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƌĂƚĞĚďŽƚŚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ůŽĐĂůĐŚĂŶĐĞƐůŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶ
did those ignored by Conservative canvassers. Contact from the SNP significantly increased the 
assessed likelihood of its success buƚĚŝĚŶŽƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇůŽǁĞƌŝƚƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĐŚĂŶĐĞƐ ? 
 
Finally in this first block of regressions, the four coefficients for whether the relevant party 
won in 2017 are all both positive and statistically significant. In general, therefore, respondents were 
aware of which seats each party was more likely to win, rating their chances more highly there than 
in those where they were destined to lose  W though this was of course not known at the time. The 
largest of those coefficients were for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, suggesting that respondents 
were clearer at the start of the campaign where their prospects were greater than they were for 
either the Conservatives or the SNP. (Five of the constituencies where the Conservatives came 
second to the SNP in 2017 were won by the latter with majorities of 5 percentage points or less, 
making estimates of which party would win there very difficult. Similarly, the SNP lost by 5 points or 
less in seven constituencies then and won in 15 by less than that margin  W indeed, by less than one 
percentage point in 8. Predicting such outcomes accurately would be very difficult for voters, 
however well-informed.) 
 
The second set of regressions in Table 3 uses the data on expectations and contact provided 
during the campaign itself, with very similar results to those for the pre-campaign situation. Of 
particular interest is the increased size of the coefficients for the final variable for both the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. This suggests that as the campaign proceeded local residents 
became clearer which seats they would win  W in the case of the Liberal Democrats giving an average 
evaluation 12.7 points larger on the 0-100 scale in the four seats that the party eventually won than 
in those that it lost. Respondents were less sure which seats Labour and the SNP would win, 
however: those coefficients were substantially lower (4.65 and 2.73 respectively) than those for the 
Conservative (9.19) and Liberal Democrat (12.70) parties. 
 
One difficulty with analysis of the campaign data is that some respondents were interviewed 
early in the five-week period and others much later; the latter were probably more likely to have 
been influenced by the campaign than the former. To assess whether this was the case we 
conducted regressions with the timing of their interview included as a further variable, which was 
also interacted with the contact variables: no statistically significant or substantial findings emerged 
(these results are not reported here). We also conducted further regressions using the responses to 
the contact questions asked in the post-election survey (Wave 13), which refer to the last four weeks 
of the campaign. These are reported in the final block of Table 3, with very similar findings to those 
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in the second block; contact had an impact and local respondents were better able to identify the 
seats that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were going to gain than either those which 
Labour would win or the SNP would retain. 
 
The finding in all of those regressions ƚŚĂƚŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
chances of winning in 2017 as higher in those constituencies where it was eventually successful than 
in those where it was not suggests reasonable appreciation of the geography of change across 
constituencies at an election where that change was both considerable and spatially variable both 
between and within parties. The extent to which this occurred is illustrated in a further series of 
graphs. 
 
Figure 5[a] shows the mean pre-campaign survey expectation of a 2017 Labour victory in 
each of the 59 constituencies according to its performance there in 2015. Labour won only one seat 
in 2015 and seven seats in 2017. The mean expectation of success in the one already held was high, 
at just under 70. Two of the six that it eventually won also had mean expectations greater than 50; 
for two more they were just below 50; and for the remaining two it was slightly less. There were, 
however, many others where the expectation of a Labour victory was assessed at 40 or greater but 
which the SNP won; on the other hand, the mean expectation of a Labour victory was below 40 in all 
of the seats won by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Relatively little changed during the 
campaign, as shown in Figure 5[b]. Expectations remained at 40 or greater in all six seats that Labour 
won; its chances there were considered much greater than those of either the Conservatives or the 
Liberal Democrats but those seats could not be distinguished clearly from the ones where it lost to 
the SNP again.  
 
 
<< FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Respondents were even clearer in identifying many of the seats where the Conservatives 
won in 2017. The party eventually won in all five seats where the pre-campaign expectations of a 
Conservative win exceeded 50, and it won a further three where the expectations were just below 
that level (Figure 6[a]). Further, in very few cases was there a relatively high (above c.40) 
expectation of a Conservative victory in seats that the SNP won again, but the Conservatives were 
given relatively high expectations in seats eventually won by the Liberal Democrats. (Much of the 
media discussion then and during the campaign was about the surge in support for the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ƌĞǀŝǀĂůin a few seats.) During the 
campaign, respondents became even clearer regarding the seats that the Conservatives were going 
to win (Figure 6[b]). The mean expectation of a Conservative success exceeded 50 in all but one of 
the thirteen seats eventually won, and a similar mean expectation characterised just two of the 
seats retained by the SNP. 
 
 
<< FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Local residents were even clearer regarding the likelihood of a Liberal Democrat victory 
before the campaign began. They were clearly expected to hold on to the single seat won in 2015 
and there were relatively high expectations of a win in a small number of others, including the three 
that the party eventually gained from the SNP (Figure 7[a]); expectations in almost all of the other 
seats were very low. This pattern was clarified during the campaign (Figure 7[b]); there was just one 
seat where the expectation of a Liberal Democrat victory exceeded 50 but it was retained by the 
SNP. 
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<< FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
Finally, before the campaign started in 2017 expectations of an SNP victory were high in 
almost all seats, exceeding 50 in all but two  W those won by the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats respectively in 2015 (Figure 8[a]). There was a clear appreciation that the SNP was quite 
likely to lose in those seats won in 2015 by a margin of 10 points or less, however, and two of the 
seats lost to Labour also had relatively low expectations of an SNP victory. But across the large 
majority of the seats won by the SNP in 2015 by a margin of 10-20 points there was no clear 
distinction between those that it won again and those that would be lost to one of the three 
competitors. Little changed during the campaign; expectations of an SNP victory remained around 
70 points in many of the seats lost to either of the Conservatives or Labour (Figure 8[b])  W only in the 
four seats won by the Liberal Democrats were the expectations of an SNP victory relatively low, 
though still above 60. 
 
<< FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 
Further exploration of these data again show that the respondents were not playing zero-
sum games  W for most the sum of their expectations across all four parties exceeded 100. This is 
illustrated in Figure 9[a], which plots the mean expectation of an SNP victory in each constituency in 
the 2017 campaign wave against the mean for a Conservative victory. In all 59 cases the mean 
expectation of an SNP victory exceeds 50, as it also does for the Conservatives in 12 of the 13 seats 
that they won. Local residents believed that another SNP victory was likely in those seats, therefore, 
but also that the Conservatives had a reasonable chance of winning there  W better than in almost all 
of the other constituencies, where the respondents gave the Conservatives a likelihood of victory of 
less than 50. (Such uncertainty was understandable: the SNP won 17 of its 35 seats in 2017 with less 
than 40 per cent of the votes, and eight of them by a majority of less than one percentage point: 
Johnston et al., 2017.) Further, there were only four seats (three won by the SNP and one by the 
Liberal Democrats) where the mean expectation of a Conservative victory exceeded 50, but the seat 
was not won. 
 
<< FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
/ŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ŚĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌďĞƚƐ ? ?dŚŽƐĞůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚe 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐǁŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĂƐƐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĂůŽĐĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌǇthere 
higher than were respondents in other constituencies; they were aware of the geography of the 
surge of support for the Conservatives but they still thought another SNP victory quite likely  W giving 
it a mean expectation of more than 55 in each case and more than 60 in most. Local respondents 
ĂůƐŽĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĂůŽĐĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŚŝŐŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƵƌƐĞĂƚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽŶ
than in almost all others, but in three of the four cases also gave a mean expectation greater than 60 
for an SNP victory. But there was much less clarity locally with regard to the seven seats that Labour 
won (Figure 9[b]). The Conservative and Liberal Democrats victories were much more anticipated 
ůŽĐĂůůǇƚŚĂŶǁĞƌĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ? 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our analyses largely confirm the findings of the emerging literature on 'citizen forecasting' ?ŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
predictions of the likely outcomes of elections in their constituencies are generally accurate, though 
some are more accurate in their predictions than others. But we take the argument further by 
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considering the influence of both the local electoral context ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŽǁŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ on 
ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ. Both prove important parts of the overall picture. 
 
It is not surprising that most British voters can accurately predict which party will win in their 
home constituency at a forthcoming general election since the great majority of constituencies are 
safe for one of the parties which is unlikely to have to yield its incumbency there. But when the 
outcome is uncertain because of substantial changes in the electoral fortunes of one or more parties 
then local residents may be less clear on the likely outcome. In this paper, we have explored 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞĂĐŚŽĨĨŽƵƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨǁŝŶŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƚ
the 2015 and 2017 General Elections in Scotland, both of which were characterised by very 
substantial changes between contests in two or more paƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐŚĂƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐĐĂƐƚĂŶĚŶƵŵďĞƌ
ŽĨƐĞĂƚƐǁŽŶ ?ƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĚŽƵďůĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
previous contest, and its number of seats increased more than eight-fold. That surge was widely 
forecast in the media before and during the campaign, and most BES respondents were clearly 
aware of it. 
 
dǁŽǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞǁĂƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďǇĂůŵŽƐƚŽŶĞ-third overall, but by much 
more in some constituencies than others. Again, the likelihood of this shift was widely appreciated 
by the media both before and increasingly during the campaign, but respondents were less clear 
whether it would have an impact in their home constituency; they thought a further SNP victory 
there more likely than not. The beneficiary of the decline in SNP support varied across 
constituencies, with each of its three competitors winning some seats. In general, respondents were 
aware which of those parties was more likely to be the major beneficiary locally, and that awareness 
was clarified during the campaign, although the local advances made by the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties were more clearly appreciated than were those of the Labour party  W and they 
were also less certain in which seats the SNP would perform relatively badly. Contacts from the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐĂŶǀĂƐƐĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶƚŚĂƚĐůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ PƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĞĚďǇĂƉĂƌƚǇĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the campaign on average rated its chances of success in a constituency as greater than did those not 
contacted  W and in addition those who identified with a party on average rated its chances of success 
locally higher than those who did not. 
 
In general, therefore, Scottish voters were certainly not unaware of both the national and 
local trends in party support at those two contests when party vote shares and occupancy of 
parliamentary seats changed very substantially. But where the extent of the change locally was 
uncertain  W which was the case in 2017 much more than in 2015  W that was reflected in their 
expectations; they tended to  ‘ŚĞĚŐĞƚŚĞŝƌďĞƚƐ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶŵŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐďǇŐŝǀŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚ
expectations of a further SNP victory but also expectations greater than evens of victory by the 
opposition party considered most likely to win there. On average, they were aware of the general 
trends but not  W and probably unsurprisingly so given the final outcome in many constituencies  W of 
their particular trajectory in individual constituencies. But the analyses show considerable variability 
around such averages with some voters, especially those not interested in the election, those who 
do not identify with a party, and those whose support was not canvassed during the campaign less 
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐůŽĐĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ. Even where there 
was considerable change in the local electoral situation, therefore, these analyses have provided 
largely positive answers to the questions posed: voters were generally aware of which parties had 
the best chances of success locally, an awareness that was crystallised during the campaign as more 
information was provided on which they based their evaluations, but given the closeness of the 
outcome in a substantial number of seats that many voters predicted the wrong winner is 
unsurprising. Nevertheless, the more information they were provided by the parties that canvassed 
their support the more likely it was that voters would, correctly, expect it to win locally: information 
mattered in that electoral decision-making. 
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Table 1. Expectations of a local party victory by the result at the previous and next election in 2015. 
 
 Expectation of SNP Victory 2015  
SNP Margin 2010 0-24 25-39 40-49 50-59 60-75 75-100 N 
< -30  12.1 7.5 7.9 11.4 20.8 40.2 945 
 -29: -20 10.0 7.6 6.3 13.8 20.0 42.3 986 
 -19: -10 8.3 4.9 8.6 10.2 14.7 53.4 266 
 0: -9 * * * * * * * 
 0: +9 7.6 3.1 3.8 4.6 8.4 72.5 131 
 +10< 6.3 3.8 5.1 6.3 11.4 67.1 79 
TOTAL  10.4 6.9 7.0 11.7 18.8 45.2 2,407 
 Expectation of SNP Victory 2015  
SNP Margin 2015 0-24 25-39 40-49 50-59 60-75 75-100 N 
 < 0  18.2 13.1 8.0 12.4 24.1 24.1 137 
 0: +4 14.1 10.9 7.6 13.0 18.5 35.9 92 
 5: +9 8.6 8.1 12.2 13.7 21.3 36.0 197 
 10: +14 10.3 6.7 7.6 14.1 21.7 39.6 341 
 15: +19 9.6 6.2 6.0 9.4 18.9 49.8 646 
 +20< 9.9 5.9 6.2 11.8 16.6 49.6 994 
TOTAL  10.4 6.9 7.0 11.7 18.8 45.2 2,407 
 
Table 2. Expectations of a local party victory by the result at the previous and next election in 2017. 
 
 Expectation of SNP Victory 2017  
SNP Margin 2015 0-24 25-39 40-49 50-59 60-75 75-100 N 
 < 0  19.5 11.4 16.3 14.6 17.1 21.1 123 
 0: +4 11.2 6.7 10.1 14.6 20.2 37.1 89 
 5: +9 8.8 4.4 5.9 14.7 20.6 45.6 204 
 10: +14 9.7 4.4 6.3 7.5 18.1 54.1 320 
 15: +19 9.8 2.8 4.7 4.4 19.0 59.3 642 
 +20< 9.0 4.2 4.8 5.3 16.0 60.6 995 
TOTAL  9.9 4.3 5.9 7.0 17.7 55.2 2,373 
 Expectation of SNP Victory 2017  
SNP Margin 2017 0-24 25-39 40-49 50-59 60-75 75-100 N 
< -20  9.9 8.9 13.9 17.8 18.8 30.7 101 
 -19: -10 11.8 4.6 7.8 12.4 22.2 41.2 153 
 -9: 0 8.7 4.0 5.5 7.0 19.4 55.3 1,291 
 0: +4 10.6 3.9 4.2 6.0 17.5 57.8 566 
 +5: +9 8.1 3.4 4.2 4.9 16.6 62.8 471 
 +10< 8.6 4.3 4.8 4.8 13.9 63.6 209 
TOTAL  9.2 4.1 5.4 7.0 18.3 56.0 2,791 
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Table 3. Regressions of expectations of each party winning the local constituency in the pre-
campaign and campaign surveys before the 2017 election (coefficients significant at the 0.05 level or 
better are shown in bold) 
 
 Con Lab LD SNP 
Pre-Campaign 
Constant 52.18 48.47 45.23 56.50 
Margin2015 0.59 0.52 0.57 0.38 
Identifier 15.58 11.76 11.73 10.66 
Contacted by  
 Conservative 2.99 -3.26 -2.48 1.65 
 Labour -1.81 5.05 -0.22 -2.53 
 Liberal Democrat 2.59 -3.46 6.68 1.48 
 SNP -1.33 -1.85 -1.14 3.22  
Party Won in 2017 4.91 7.71 8.49 2.85 
R2  0.18 0.14 0.26 0.07 
Campaign  
Constant 56.73 51.40 44.67 58.86 
Margin2015 0.46 0.52 0.57 0.20 
Identifier 12.13 12.39 7.81 11.51 
Contacted by 
 Conservative 5.57 -3.59 -2.99 -1.06 
 Labour -0.97 7.86 -0.96 -0.03 
 Liberal Democrat -2.63 -0.92 7.59 -0.58 
 SNP -4.85 -4.67 -1.13 5.84 
Party Won in 2017 9.19 4.65 12.70 2.63 
R2  0.16 0.13 0.28 0.06 
Campaign (Post-Campaign Contact) 
Constant 57.02 52.09 45.52 56.62 
Margin2015 0.45 0.51 0.58 0.23 
Identifier 12.08 11.89 8.12 11.42 
Contacted by 
 Conservative 6.68 -4.75 -3.06 -1.61 
 Labour -2.71 7.48 0.97 -1.06 
 Liberal Democrat -2.48 -3.73 4.86 1.14 
 SNP -4.54 -3.30 -2.21 7.86 
Party Won in 2017 9.12 4.98 13.39 2.87 
R2  0.16 0.13 0.28 0.06 
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Figure 1. Frequency ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ
winning in their home constituency in the 2015 pre-campaign survey 
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Figure 2. Frequency ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ
winning in their home constituency in the 2017 pre-campaign survey 
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 Figure 3. Mean expectations of SNP and Labour wins in constituencies at the 2015 election in the (a) 
pre-campaign and (b) campaign surveys. 
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Figure 4. Mean Expectations of SNP and Conservative wins in constituencies at the 2017 election in 
the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign surveys. 
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Figure 5. Mean expectations of a Labour constituency victory, graphed against its margin of victory/defeat 
in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 6. Mean expectations of a Conservative constituency victory, graphed against its margin of 
victory/defeat in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys. 
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Figure 7. Mean expectations of a Liberal Democrat constituency victory, graphed against its margin of 
victory/defeat in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8. Mean expectations of an SNP constituency victory, graphed against its margin of victory/defeat in 
2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys. 
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Figure 9. Mean expectations of (a) a Conservative constituency victory and (b) a Labour constituency 
victory against the mean expectation of an SNP constituency victory in the 2017 campaign survey. 
 
  
 
